JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber)

16 October 2014 (*)

(Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the Community word mark United Autoglas — Earlier national figurative mark AUTOGLASS — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

In Case T‑297/13,

Junited Autoglas Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG, established in Cologne (Germany), represented by C. Weil, lawyer,

applicant,

v

Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), represented by M. Rajh and J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agents,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM, intervener before the General Court, being

Belron Hungary Kft — Zug Branch, established in Zug (Switzerland), represented by L. Christy, lawyer,

ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 3 April 2013 (Case R 206/2012-2) concerning opposition proceedings between Belron Hungary Kft — Zug Branch and Junited Autoglas Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber),

composed of A. Dittrich (Rapporteur), President, J. Schwarcz and V. Tomljenović, Judges,

Registrar: E. Coulon,

having regard to the application lodged at the Court Registry on 29 May 2013,

having regard to the response of OHIM lodged at the Court Registry on 30 August 2013,

having regard to the response of the intervener lodged at the Court Registry on 2 September 2013,

having regard to the reply lodged at the Court Registry 7 October 2013,

having regard to the fact that no application for a hearing was submitted by the parties within the period of one month from notification of closure of the written procedure, and having therefore decided, acting upon a report of the Judge-Rapporteur, to give a ruling without an oral procedure, pursuant to Article 135a of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

 Background to the dispute

1        On 14 June 2007, the applicant, Junited Autoglas Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG, filed an application for registration of a Community trade mark at the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1), as amended (replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1)).

2        The mark for which registration was sought is the word sign United Autoglas.

3        The goods and services in respect of which registration was sought are, inter alia, in Classes 12 and 37 of the Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and correspond, for each of those classes, to the following description:

–        Class 12: ‘Vehicles; apparatus for locomotion by land, air or water; parts for land vehicles, namely windscreens, glass for car windows, sunscreen films, headlamps and headlamp glasses, sun roofs and mirrors’.

–        Class 37: ‘Building construction; repair; installation services; automobile glazing services; glazing’.

4        The Community trade mark application was published in Community Trade Marks Bulletin No 62/2007 of 12 November 2007.

5        On 18 January 2008, the intervener, Belron Hungary Kft — Zug Branch, filed a notice of opposition under Article 42 of Regulation No 40/94 (now Article 41 of Regulation No 207/2009) against registration of the mark applied for, inter alia, in respect of the goods and services referred to in paragraph 3 above.

6        The opposition was based, inter alia, on the national figurative mark, registered in Poland on 7 December 2005 under No 170096 (‘the earlier mark’), reproduced below:

That mark designates goods and services in Classes 12, 21 and 37 and corresponds, for each of those classes, to the following description:

–        Class 12: ‘windshields, windscreens, windows, sunroofs, mirror glasses, all for vehicles’;

–        Class 21: ‘glass for vehicle windows; unworked and semi-worked glass (other than building glass); glassware; glass for vehicle lamps; glass fibres, all in the form of sheets (not textile), blocks and rods, all for use in manufacture; non-electric instruments and materials included in Class 21, all for cleaning purposes’;

–        Class 37: ‘installation of windscreens, glass and glazing products, windows, body glass, alarms, sound systems and parts and fittings for vehicles; maintenance and repair of vehicle glass; advisory and consultancy services relating to all the aforesaid services’.

7        As the basis of the opposition, the intervener relied in particular on the ground for refusal referred to in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009).

8        On 9 January 2012, OHIM’s Opposition Division upheld the opposition concerning the goods and services in Classes 12 and 37 listed in paragraph 3 above.

9        On 26 January 2012 the applicant filed an appeal with OHIM, under Articles 58 to 64 of Regulation No 207/2009, against the decision of the Opposition Division.

10      By decision of 3 April 2013 (‘the contested decision’), the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM dismissed the appeal. In particular, the Board of Appeal, on the basis of the earlier mark, concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, with regard to the goods and services in Classes 12 and 37.

11      First, the Board of Appeal held that the relevant public was the public in Poland and that the goods and services covered by the trade mark sought and the earlier mark (together ‘the marks at issue’) were mainly directed at the general public. In respect of certain products which are expensive and infrequently purchased, such as ‘vehicles’ and ‘apparatus for locomotion by land, air or water’, the Board of Appeal held that the level of attention of the relevant public was high. Concerning the other goods and services, it considered that the level of attention was average. Furthermore, the Board of Appeal found that the goods and services in Classes 12 and 37 covered by the application for the trade mark sought were similar or identical to goods and services covered by the earlier mark. Lastly, with regard to the comparison of the signs, the Board of Appeal observed that the marks were visually similar to a medium or, at least, low degree and that they were to some degree phonetically and conceptually similar.

 Forms of order sought

12      The applicant claims that the Court should:

–        annul the contested decision;

–        reject the opposition brought by the intervener against the application for registration of the trade mark sought;

–        order OHIM to pay the costs, including those incurred by the applicant before the Board of Appeal;

–        order the intervener to pay the costs, including those incurred by the applicant before the Board of Appeal.

13      OHIM contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

14      The intervener contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

 Law

15      In support of its action, the applicant raises a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009.

16      The applicant claims that there is no likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue. It maintains that the relevant public will perceive the term ‘autoglas(s)’ in the two marks as descriptive and as designating glass for automobiles, and that it will therefore pay more attention to the first element of the trade mark sought, namely the term ‘united’.

17      OHIM and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

18      According to Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for may not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier mark.

19      According to settled case-law, the risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically-linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. According to that same line of case-law, the likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and the goods or services in question, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services designated (see judgment of 9 July 2003 in Laboratorios RTB v OHIM — Giorgio Beverley Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLEY HILLS), T‑162/01, ECR, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 33 and the case-law cited).

20      Furthermore, in order to find that there exists a likelihood of confusion as referred to in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, it is not necessary to find that that likelihood exists for the whole of the relevant public. It is enough that it exists for a significant part of that public (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 November 2011 in Esprit International v OHIM — Marc O’Polo International (Representation of a letter on a pocket), T‑22/10, ECR, EU:T:2011:651, paragraphs 120 and 121 and the case-law cited).

 The relevant public

21      It is settled case-law that, in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, account should be taken of the average consumer of the category of goods concerned, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question (see judgment of 13 February 2007 in Mundipharma v OHIM — Altana Pharma (RESPICUR), T‑256/04, ECR, EU:T:2007:46, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

22      As regards the relevant public, the Board of Appeal correctly held that the goods and services covered by the marks at issue were directed mainly at the general public in Poland. That is not disputed in the present case.

 The comparison of the goods and services

23      According to settled case-law, in order to assess the similarity of the goods or services concerned, all the relevant features of the relationship between those goods or services should be taken into account. Those factors include, inter alia, their nature, their intended purpose and their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary. Other factors may also be taken into account, such as the distribution channels of the goods concerned (see judgment of 11 July 2007 in El Corte Inglés v OHIM — Bolaños Sabri (PiraÑAM diseño original Juan Bolaños), T‑443/05, ECR, EU:T:2007:219, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

24      The Board of Appeal correctly held, without being contradicted on this point by the parties, that the goods and services in Classes 12 and 37 covered by the application for the trade mark sought were similar or identical to goods and services in respect of which the earlier mark is protected.

 The comparison of the signs

25      The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, in relation to the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, must be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant components. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global appreciation of that likelihood of confusion. In this regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007 in OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, ECR, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

26      In the present case, the earlier mark is composed of a word element, the term ‘autoglass’, written in capital letters, and a figurative element placed above that word, composed of a white triangle followed by a white rectangle, two black rectangles and a black triangle. The trade mark sought is a word mark composed of the two words ‘united’ and ‘autoglas’.

 The elements of the trade mark sought to be taken into consideration in the comparison of the signs

27      The assessment of the similarity between two marks means more than taking just one component of a composite trade mark and comparing it with another mark. On the contrary, the comparison must be made by examining each of the marks in question as a whole, which does not mean that the overall impression conveyed to the relevant public by a composite trade mark may not, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components (see judgment in OHIM v Shaker, cited in paragraph 25 above, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). It is only if all the other components of the mark are negligible that the assessment of the similarity can be carried out solely on the basis of the dominant element (judgment in OHIM v Shaker, cited in paragraph 25 above, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 42, and judgment of 20 September 2007 in Nestlé v OHIM, C‑193/06 P, ECR, EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 42). That could be the case, in particular, where that component is capable on its own of dominating the image of that mark which members of the relevant public retain, so that all the other components are negligible in the overall impression created by that mark (judgment in Nestlé v OHIM, EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 43).

28      In the present case, the applicant asserts that the word ‘autoglas’ for the relevant public in Poland designates glass for automobiles. Since, according to the applicant, it is a descriptive term and therefore devoid of distinctive character, it will be disregarded by the relevant consumer. Consequently, the term ‘united’ will hold a dominant position in the trade mark sought.

29      It is settled case-law that a sign is descriptive if there is a sufficiently direct and specific relationship between the sign and the goods and services in question to enable the public concerned immediately to perceive, without further thought, a description of one of the characteristics of the goods and services in question (see judgment of 17 October 2012 in MIP Metro v OHIM — J. C. Ribeiro (MISS B), T‑485/10, ECR, EU:T:2012:554, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

30      In this connection, the term ‘autoglas’ exists in German and English (spelled ‘auto glass’ in English) and in both languages it designates glass for automobiles.

31      For the purpose of assessing the distinctive character of a word element of a mark, it is necessary to examine its meaning for the relevant public. In that context, it must first be recalled that it is possible that, because of linguistic, cultural, social and economic differences between the Member States, a sign which is devoid of distinctive character or descriptive of the goods or services concerned in one Member State is not so in another Member State (judgment of 9 March 2006 in Matratzen Concord, C‑421/04, ECR, EU:C:2006:164, paragraph 25). The meaning of the term ‘autoglas’ for the average Polish consumer must therefore be examined.

32      As regards the second part of the term ‘autoglas’, the German word ‘glas’ (meaning ‘glass’), it must be noted that the corresponding term in Polish is ‘szkło’. Thus, there is clearly no similarity between the two words. The applicant’s claim that the average Polish consumer would understand the word ‘autoglas’ therefore assumes that the relevant public has sufficient knowledge of either German or English, given the similarity between the German term ‘glas’ and the English term ‘glass’. Although many consumers in the European Union know basic English vocabulary (see, to that effect, concerning the English terms ‘star’, ‘snack’ and ‘food’, judgment of 11 May 2010 in Wessang v OHIM — Greinwald (star foods), T‑492/08, ECR, EU:T:2010:186, paragraph 52), the term ‘glass’ cannot be considered to form part of such basic vocabulary.

33      In submitting that the term ‘autoglas’ is descriptive for the relevant public, the applicant thus attributes a relatively high level of comprehension of either German or English to the average Polish consumer, without providing any evidence in support of this assertion.

34      Next, concerning the first part of the term ‘autoglas’, the word ‘auto’, that word may, in Polish, either signify ‘automobile’ or be understood as a reference to an automatic device.

35      Even if, as the applicant submits, the relevant public associates the term ‘auto’, when it is used in relation with the goods and services at issue, solely with automobiles, the fact remains that the term ‘autoglas’ cannot be considered to be descriptive for the part of the Polish consumers who do not have a certain level of English or German. In the light of the lack of meaning of the word ‘glas’ for that part of the relevant public, the term ‘autoglas’ as a whole has no meaning either.

36      The Board of Appeal, on the contrary, was fully entitled to observe that the term ‘autoglas’ was of medium distinctive character.

37      In so far as the applicant relies on several decisions of OHIM in support of its argument relating to the alleged descriptive character of the term ‘autoglas’, it must be observed that, in accordance with the principle of sound administration, the adjudicating bodies of OHIM must, when examining an application for registration of a Community trade mark, take into account the decisions already taken in respect of similar applications and consider with especial care whether it should decide in the same way or not (judgment of 10 March 2011 in Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM, C‑51/10 P, ECR, EU:C:2011:139, paragraphs 73 and 74; see also, by analogy, order of 12 February 2009 in Bild digital and ZVS, C‑39/08 and C‑43/08, ECR, EU:C:2009:91, paragraph 17).

38      However, it is settled case-law that the decisions concerning registration of a sign as a Community trade mark which the Boards of Appeal of OHIM are led to take under Regulation No 207/2009 are adopted in the exercise of circumscribed powers and are not a matter of discretion. Accordingly, the legality of those decisions must be assessed solely on the basis of that regulation and not on the basis of a previous decision-making practice (judgments of 26 April 2007 in Alcon v OHIM, C‑412/05 P, ECR, EU:C:2007:252, paragraph 65, and of 24 November 2005 in Sadas v OHIM — LTJ Diffusion (ARTHUR ET FELICIE), T‑346/04, ECR, EU:T:2005:420, paragraph 71).

39      Moreover, the decisions of OHIM cited by the applicant are irrelevant to the present case. The decisions of the First Board of Appeal of 8 July 2004, R 189/2004-1, and of 16 January 2006, R 721/2005-1, and the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of 18 January 2007, R 1165/2005-4, concern the comprehension of the English term ‘glass’ by an English-speaking public, while the decision of the First Board of Appeal of 10 September 2008 R 1088/2007-1, concerns the meaning of the German term ‘glas’ for the German public. The other decisions cited by the applicant on this matter concern only the meaning of the term ‘auto’ in a composite term and are therefore also irrelevant to the present case.

40      It is next necessary to examine the applicant’s claim that the term ‘united’ holds a dominant position in the trade mark sought on account of its position at the beginning of the sign.

41      First, it is true that the initial part of a word mark is likely to retain the consumer’s attention more than the parts that follow (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 March 2004 in El Corte Inglés v OHIM — González Cabello (MUNDICOR), T‑183/02 and T‑184/02, ECR, EU:T:2004:79, paragraph 81, and of 16 March 2005 in L’Oréal v OHIM — Revlon (FLEXI AIR), T‑112/03, ECR, EU:T:2005:102, paragraphs 64 and 65).

42      Moreover, the English word ‘united’, like the term ‘glass’, is not elementary English vocabulary. Like the word ‘glass’, it is therefore meaningless for the part of the relevant public which does not have a certain level of knowledge of English.

43      The Board of Appeal’s argument that the average Polish consumer knows of companies such as United Airlines or of the name ‘the United States of America’ is not such as to call in question this finding. Even though the average Polish consumer might recognise the term ‘united’, there is nothing to suggest that he also understands its meaning.

44      Nevertheless, the findings made at paragraphs 41 to 43 above do not bear out the applicant’s assertion that only the term ‘united’ must be used for the purposes of comparing the signs. Taking account of the foregoing observations concerning the distinctive character of the term ‘autoglas’, neither of the two elements of the trade mark sought can be considered to be dominant.

45      As regards the applicant’s assertion that the Board of Appeal found that the average Polish consumer will disregard the ‘united’ element of the trade mark sought and focus only on the ‘autoglas’ element, it must be observed that no such finding is made in the contested decision. On the contrary, it is apparent from point 39 of the contested decision that, according to the Board of Appeal, the trade mark sought does not contain any element which might be considered to be manifestly more distinctive or dominant in comparison with the other elements.

46      It follows from the foregoing that the applicant’s argument that the word element ‘united’ holds a dominant position in the mark sought and that the element ‘autoglas’ will be disregarded by the relevant public, must be rejected as unfounded. On the contrary, the mark sought must be considered as a whole when comparing the signs.

 Visual similarity

47      As regards the visual comparison, it must be recalled, first of all, that there is nothing to prevent a determination as to whether there is any visual similarity between a word mark and a figurative mark, since the two types of mark have graphic form capable of creating a visual impression (see judgment of 4 May 2005 in Chum v OHIM — Star TV (STAR TV), T‑359/02, ECR, EU:T:2005:156, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

48      In its decision, the Board of Appeal takes the view that the marks at issue are visually similar to a medium degree or, at least, to a low degree.

49      It must be held that the word element of the earlier mark and the second element of the trade mark sought are highly similar and even almost identical, the only difference being the second ‘s’ at the end of the word ‘autoglas(s)’, which has only a negligible visual effect. On the other hand, the marks are distinguished by the presence of the first element of the mark sought, namely the term ‘united’, and the presence of the figurative element of the earlier mark.

50      Concerning the figurative element in the earlier mark, it is settled case-law that, where a mark is composed of word elements and figurative elements, the former are, as a rule, more distinctive than the latter, because the average consumer will more readily refer to the goods in question by quoting the name rather than by describing the figurative element of the mark (see judgment of 7 February 2013 in AMC-Representações Têxteis v OHIM — MIP Metro (METRO KIDS COMPANY), T‑50/12, ECR, EU:T:2013:68, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

51      In the present case, it must be pointed out that, despite being slightly smaller than the word element, the figurative element has some impact on the overall visual impression produced by the earlier mark, taking account of its position, the space it occupies in that mark and its form.

52      As regards the trade mark sought, it must be pointed out that the two word elements have, visually, the same impact on the perception of the sign. Admittedly, the term ‘united’ constitutes the first part of the trade mark sought. However, the word ‘autoglas’, composed of eight letters, is longer than the term ‘united’, composed of six letters.

53      Therefore, having regard to the high degree of similarity between the second element of the mark sought and the single word element of the earlier mark but also to the differences between the signs, it must be concluded that there is a low degree of visual similarity between the signs.

 Phonetic similarity

54      For the purposes of comparing the two marks phonetically, it must first of all be stated that the terms ‘autoglas’ and ‘autoglass’ are pronounced in the same way, despite the additional ‘s’ in the earlier mark.

55      Furthermore, it must be observed that the phonetic impact of the two word elements of the trade mark sought must be considered to be similar, taking account of the fact that they have the same number of syllables.

56      Given the identical pronunciation of the term ‘autoglas(s)’ in both marks, the Board of Appeal was correct to conclude that there was some phonetic similarity. That similarity must be described as medium.

 Conceptual similarity

57      The Board of Appeal observed that there was some conceptual similarity between the two marks. The applicant disputes this finding by arguing that the term ‘autoglas(s)’ is descriptive.

58      As stated above, the term ‘autoglas(s)’ will not be associated with glass for automobiles by those of the average Polish consumers who do not have a certain level of English or German. However, both marks contain the term ‘auto’ and will therefore evoke, from the point of view of the relevant public, either automobiles or automatic devices. Even if, as the applicant asserts, the average Polish consumer associates the term ‘auto’ only with automobiles, the fact remains that the marks at issue are conceptually similar in this respect.

59      On that basis, as the Board of Appeal noted, the two signs must be considered to be to some degree conceptually similar.

 The likelihood of confusion

60      The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account, and in particular between the similarity of the marks and the similarity of the goods or services concerned. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998 in Canon, C‑39/97, ECR, EU:C:1998:159, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006 in Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM — Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, ECR, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).

61      So far as concerns, first of all, the applicant’s argument that only the figurative elements of the earlier mark are protected on account of the allegedly descriptive character of the element ‘autoglass’, it must be pointed out that the term ‘autoglass’ is not descriptive from the point of view of the part of the relevant public which does not have a certain level of English or German. Furthermore, the term ‘autoglass’ is of medium distinctive character (see paragraphs 32 to 36 above).

62      The applicant’s claim that the Board of Appeal shares its view concerning the low distinctive character of the earlier mark is incorrect. In that regard, the applicant seems to be referring to point 48 of the contested decision without taking account of the fact that, in that point, the Board of Appeal is merely putting forward a hypothesis.

63      In the light of the similarity between the signs and of the fact that the goods and services covered by the marks at issue are partly similar and partly identical, the Board of Appeal was correct to find that there was a risk that the relevant public might consider the goods and services to come from the same undertaking where they are offered under the marks at issue and that there was therefore a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009.

64      Contrary to what the applicant maintains, the presence of the element ‘united’ in the trade mark sought is not sufficient to prevent a likelihood of confusion. The presence of that element does not rule out the possibility that the consumer might consider the trade mark sought to constitute a mere variant of the earlier mark on account of the presence of the element ‘autoglas’, which is almost identical to the sole word element present in the earlier mark.

65      Lastly, it is not necessary to examine the applicant’s argument that, contrary to what was held by the Board of Appeal, the level of attention of the relevant public at the time of purchase is high in respect of all the goods and services at issue, and not in respect of a part only of those goods and services.

66      In the circumstances of the present case, even a high level of attention on the part of the relevant public would not call into question the likelihood of confusion. Admittedly, a consumer who is highly attentive will notice differences between the marks at issue. However, there is still a risk that a consumer, even one who is highly attentive, may think that the trade mark sought is a variant of the earlier mark.

67      Since the plea alleging an infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, put forward by the applicant in support of its claims, is unfounded, the action must be dismissed in its entirety, without there being any need to rule on the admissibility of the applicant’s second head of claim.

 Costs

68      Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the OHIM and the intervener.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber)

hereby:

1.      Dismisses the action;

2.      Orders Junited Autoglas Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG to pay the costs.

Dittrich

Schwarcz

Tomljenović

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 16 October 2014.

[Signatures]