JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber)

10 March 2016 (*)

(Community trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the Community figurative mark MINICARGO — Earlier Community word mark MINI — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009)

In Case T‑160/15,

LG Developpement, established in Baud (France), represented by A. Sion, lawyer,

applicant,

v

Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), represented by J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agent,

defendant,

the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM, intervener before the General Court, being

Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, established in Munich (Germany), represented by R. Delorey, lawyer,

ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 23 January 2015 (Case R 596/2014-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Bayerische Motorenwerke AG and LG Developpement,

THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber),

composed of M. van der Woude (Rapporteur), President, I. Wiszniewska-Białecka and I. Ulloa Rubio, Judges,

Registrar: M.E. Coulon,

having regard to the application lodged at the Court Registry on 1 April 2015,

having regard to the response of OHIM lodged at the Court Registry on 1 July 2015,

having regard to the response of the intervener lodged at the Court Registry on 26 June 2015,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the main parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

 Background to the dispute

1        On 19 October 2012, the applicant, LG Developpement, filed an application for registration of a Community trade mark with the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1).

2        Registration as a mark was sought for the following figurative sign:

3        The goods in respect of which registration was sought are in Class 12 of the Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and correspond to the following description: ‘Apparatus for locomotion by land, namely trailers’.

4        The Community trade mark application was published in Community Trade Marks Bulletin No 224/2012 of 23 November 2012.

5        On 19 February 2013, the intervener, Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, filed a notice of opposition pursuant to Article 41 of Regulation No 207/2009 to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above.

6        The opposition was based on the earlier Community word mark MINI, covering goods in Class 12 corresponding to the following description: ‘Land vehicles; parts, components and accessories for all the aforesaid goods’.

7        The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009.

8        On 23 December 2013, the Opposition Division rejected the opposition on the ground that there was no likelihood of confusion.

9        On 18 February 2014, the intervener filed a notice of appeal with OHIM, pursuant to Articles 58 and 64 of Regulation No 207/2009, against the decision of the Opposition Division.

10      By decision of 23 January 2015 (‘the contested decision’), the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM annulled the Opposition Division’s decision on the ground that there was a likelihood of confusion. As regards the relevant public, it found that that public consisted of both specialists and the general public throughout the territory of the European Union. As regards the comparison of the goods, it took the view that the goods covered by the mark applied for were identical to the goods covered by the earlier mark. As regards the comparison of the marks at issue, the Board of Appeal found that there was an average degree of visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity between them. In the light of those factors and having found that the earlier mark was reputed and was therefore highly distinctive, the Board of Appeal concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, at least for the relevant public in the United Kingdom.

 Forms of order sought

11      The applicant claims that the Court should:

–        annul the contested decision;

–        order OHIM to pay the costs.

12      OHIM and the intervener contend that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

 Law

13      In support of its action, the applicant relies on a single plea in law alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009. In its view, the Board of Appeal erred in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion. In the first place, it submits that the Board of Appeal erred as regards the definition of the relevant public. In the second place, it maintains that the Board of Appeal wrongly concluded that the goods covered by the mark applied for are identical to those covered by the earlier mark. In the third place, it takes the view that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the differences between the marks at issue were not sufficient to rule out any likelihood of confusion.

14      Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if because of its identity with, or similarity to, an earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.

15      According to settled case-law, the risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically-linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. According to the same case-law, the likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003 in Laboratorios RTB v OHIM — Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS), T‑162/01, ECR, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 33 and the case-law cited).

 The relevant public

16      According to the case-law, in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, account should be taken of the average consumer of the category of products concerned, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question (see judgment of 13 February 2007 in Mundipharma v OHIM — Altana Pharma (RESPICUR), T‑256/04, ECR, EU:T:2007:46, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

17      In the present case, the Board of Appeal found that the relevant public consisted of specialists, such as professionals in the goods transport sector, and of the general public in the European Union. However, it decided to assess the opposition with respect to the United Kingdom.

18      The applicant takes the view that, since the mark applied for consists of two words which are part of the French language, the Board of Appeal should have assessed whether there was a likelihood of confusion in relation to the relevant French, or at least European, public.

19      In that regard, it must be held, as the Board of Appeal found, that, since the earlier mark is a Community trade mark, the relevant territory is the European Union as a whole. It is not therefore appropriate to restrict the relevant public solely to the French public since the absence of a likelihood of confusion on the part of that public cannot rule out the possibility that such a likelihood of confusion may exist in another part of the European Union.

20      As regards the Board of Appeal’s choice to base its assessment on the United Kingdom public, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, for a Community trade mark to be refused registration, it is sufficient that a relative ground for refusal for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 exists in part of the European Union (see judgment of 30 September 2015 in Sequoia Capital Operations v OHIM — Sequoia Capital (SEQUOIA CAPITAL), T‑369/14, EU:T:2015:733, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited). It follows that the Board of Appeal could, for reasons of procedural economy, restrict the assessment of the likelihood of confusion to the United Kingdom public.

21      The applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal erred as regards the definition of the relevant public must therefore be rejected.

 The comparison of the goods

22      According to settled case-law, in assessing the similarity of the goods or services at issue, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services should be taken into account. Those factors include, in particular, their nature, their intended purpose, their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary. Other factors may also be taken into account such as the distribution channels of the goods concerned (see judgment of 11 July 2007 in El Corte Inglés v OHIM — Bolaños Sabri (PiraÑAM diseño original Juan Bolaños), T‑443/05, ECR, EU:T:2007:219, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

23      It must also be borne in mind that, where the goods covered by the earlier mark include the goods covered by the trade mark application, those goods are considered to be identical (see judgment of 24 November 2005 in Sadas v OHIM — LTJ Diffusion (ARTHUR ET FELICIE), T‑346/04, ECR, EU:T:2005:420, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

24      In the present case, the applicant criticises the Board of Appeal’s finding that the goods covered by the mark applied for, namely trailers, are identical to those covered by the earlier mark, which include, inter alia, land vehicles. According to the applicant, the target public for the goods covered by the earlier mark and the target public for the goods covered by the mark applied for are completely different, with the result that the goods covered by the marks at issue cannot be considered to be identical or similar. In that regard, it states that the earlier mark is associated with the luxury goods market whereas the mark applied for covers goods intended for people who are seeking to save money. Furthermore, it states that the goods covered by the mark applied for are sold through a distribution network catering for professionals.

25      It must be held, as the Board of Appeal found, that the goods covered by the earlier mark include those covered by the mark applied for. The trailers covered by the mark applied for are part of the broader category of land vehicles covered by the earlier mark. That category is not limited to a particular market, such as the luxury goods market or to a given method of marketing.

26      Consequently, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 23 above, the Board of Appeal’s finding that the goods covered by the marks at issue are identical must be upheld.

 The comparison of the signs

27      The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In this regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007 in OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, ECR, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

28      Assessment of the similarity between two marks means more than taking just one component of a composite trade mark and comparing it with another mark. On the contrary, the comparison must be made by examining each of the marks in question as a whole, which does not mean that the overall impression conveyed to the relevant public by a composite trade mark may not, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components (see judgment in OHIM v Shaker, cited in paragraph 27 above, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). It is only if all the other components of the mark are negligible that the assessment of the similarity can be carried out solely on the basis of the dominant element (judgment in OHIM v Shaker, cited in paragraph 27 above, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 42, and judgment of 20 September 2007 in Nestlé v OHIM, C‑193/06 P, EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 42). That could be the case, in particular, where that component is capable on its own of dominating the image of that mark which members of the relevant public retain, with the result that all the other components are negligible in the overall impression created by that mark (judgment in Nestlé v OHIM, EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 43).

29      Furthermore, the fact that a mark consists exclusively of the earlier mark, to which another word element has been added, is an indication that those two trade marks are similar (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 November 2008 in ecoblue v OHIM — Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (Ecoblue), T‑281/07, EU:T:2008:489, paragraph 28, and judgment of 28 October 2009 in X-Technology R & D Swiss v OHIM — Ipko-Amcor (First-On-Skin), T‑273/08, EU:T:2009:418, paragraph 31).

30      In the present case, the signs to be compared are, on the one hand, the figurative mark applied for MINICARGO and, on the other hand, the earlier word mark MINI.

31      The Board of Appeal found that there was an average degree of visual and phonetic similarity between the signs at issue inasmuch as, in essence, the earlier mark is fully included in the mark applied for and is placed at the beginning of that mark. According to the Board of Appeal, neither the figurative elements — namely, in particular, the red rectangle in which the word elements of the mark applied for are written in white letters — nor the differences linked to the presence of the word element ‘cargo’ in that mark were capable of affecting that conclusion in so far as they were not capable of dominating the overall impression created by the mark. As regards the conceptual comparison, the Board of Appeal took the view that the marks at issue were also similar to an average degree since they have the element ‘mini’, which means ‘very small’, in common.

32      The applicant maintains that the Board of Appeal did not compare the marks at issue as a whole. In the applicant’s view, an overall comparison of the marks at issue makes it possible to conclude that those marks are not similar.

33      First of all, the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal did not examine the marks at issue as a whole must be rejected. It is clear from the contested decision that the Board of Appeal took into consideration the figurative elements of the mark applied for as well as the two word elements of that mark, namely ‘mini’ and ‘cargo’, without giving dominance to the element ‘mini’. The fact that it concluded that the figurative elements of the contested mark were not capable of attracting the attention of consumers and that the word ‘cargo’ was not distinctive does not in any way mean that those elements were disregarded in the assessment of the likelihood of confusion.

34      Furthermore, it must be pointed out that, although the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details, the fact remains that, when perceiving a word sign, he will break it down into word elements which, for him, have a specific meaning or which resemble words known to him (see, to that effect, judgment in RESPICUR, cited in paragraph 16 above, EU:T:2007:46, paragraph 57, and judgment of 13 February 2008 in Sanofi-Aventis v OHIM — GD Searle (ATURION), T‑146/06, EU:T:2008:33, paragraph 58). In English, first, the word element ‘mini’ is a prefix meaning ‘very small’ and, secondly, the word ‘cargo’ means ‘load’. Those two word elements therefore have a specific meaning for the average consumer in the United Kingdom. It follows that the Board of Appeal did not err in finding that the mark MINICARGO would be understood as consisting of the word elements ‘mini’ and ‘cargo’ and in comparing the marks at issue on that basis.

 The visual similarity

35      The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal did not take into account the fact that the word ‘cargo’ constitutes the dominant element of the mark applied for. It takes the view that, given the final part of the mark applied for, the figurative elements of that mark and the different lengths of the signs at issue, those signs cannot be regarded as similar.

36      It must be pointed out, first, that there is nothing to prevent a determination as to whether there is any visual similarity between a word mark and a figurative mark, since the two types of mark have graphic form capable of creating a visual impression (see judgment of 4 May 2005 in Chum v OHIM — Star TV (STAR TV), T‑359/02, ECR, EU:T:2005:156, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

37      In the present case, the Court holds that the Board of Appeal was right in finding that there is an average degree of visual similarity between the signs at issue.

38      In the first place, it is common ground that the signs at issue have the word element ‘mini’ in common. In the light of the case-law referred to in paragraph 29 above, that element in common is therefore an indication that the marks at issue are visually similar.

39      That conclusion is a fortiori unavoidable given that the word ‘mini’ is the element at the beginning of the mark applied for. According to the case-law, the consumer normally attaches more importance to the first part of words (judgment of 17 March 2004 in El Corte Inglés v OHIM — González Cabello and Iberia Líneas Aéreas de España (MUNDICOR), T‑183/02 and T‑184/02, ECR, EU:T:2004:79, paragraph 81, and judgment of 7 February 2013 in AMC-Representações Têxteis v OHIM — MIP Metro (METRO KIDS COMPANY), T‑50/12, EU:T:2013:68, paragraph 40).

40      In the second place, as was found by the Board of Appeal, the dissimilarities between the signs at issue are not sufficient to dispel the relevant consumer’s impression that there is a certain degree of visual similarity between those signs.

41      First, as regards the addition, in the mark applied for, of the word element ‘cargo’ to the word ‘mini’, the applicant errs in claiming that that word element is the dominant element of that mark. As the Board of Appeal stated, that word element, which is understood as meaning ‘load’ by the relevant public in the United Kingdom (see paragraph 34 above), is descriptive of the goods covered by the mark applied for inasmuch as the purpose of those goods, namely trailers, is to carry loads. The word ‘cargo’ is therefore devoid of any distinctive character.

42      Next, it must be pointed out that the word element ‘cargo’, which consists of a sequence of five letters, is not much longer than the word ‘mini’, which consists of a sequence of four letters, and that neither the position of that element in the mark applied for nor its size permits the inference that it is the dominant element of the mark applied for.

43      Lastly, as regards the figurative elements of the mark applied for, namely the red rectangle in which the word element of that mark, ‘minicargo’, is written in white letters with a sparkle represented above the letter ‘n’ of that element, it must be borne in mind that, where a mark is composed of word and figurative elements, the former are, in principle, more distinctive than the latter, because the average consumer will more readily refer to the goods in question by quoting their name than by describing the figurative element of the trade mark (see judgment of 22 May 2008 in NewSoft Technology v OHIM — Soft (Presto! Bizcard Reader), T‑205/06, EU:T:2008:163, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited). That is the case here since, as the Board of Appeal found, the red rectangle in which the word element of the mark applied for is written in white letters is not at all novel and is not therefore capable of attracting the attention of the consumers. As for the little sparkle represented above the letter ‘n’, it must be stated that it will go unnoticed by the majority of the consumers or, were that not to be the case, it will, as the intervener has stated, tend more to draw the attention of the consumers to the word element ‘mini’, which is common to both of the marks at issue.

44      Consequently, the applicant has not established that the Board of Appeal erred in its assessment of the visual similarity between the signs at issue.

 The phonetic similarity

45      The applicant claims that the marks at issue are dissimilar to the extent that they can be distinguished by their rhythm and sound.

46      It must be pointed out that it is true, first, that the earlier mark only has two syllables whereas the mark applied for consists of four syllables and, secondly, that the sound of the ending of those marks is different. However, those differences cannot affect the Board of Appeal’s finding that there is an average degree of phonetic similarity between the signs at issue on account of the relevant English-speaking public’s identical pronunciation of the two syllables which those signs have in common, ‘min’ and ‘ni’.

 The conceptual similarity

47      The applicant submits that the word ‘mini’ is only a qualifier of the word ‘cargo’, which, in French, evokes something large. It also maintains that the opposition of those two words, which must be examined on the basis of their meaning in French, will be perceived by the relevant public as a play on words.

48      It must be borne in mind that the Board of Appeal could legitimately confine itself to examining the likelihood of confusion in the light of the relevant United Kingdom public (see paragraph 20 above). It cannot therefore be criticised for having relied on the meaning in English of the words which comprise the mark applied for in assessing the conceptual similarity between that mark and the earlier mark.

49      As was found by the Board of Appeal, the mark applied for will be perceived as meaning ‘very small load’ in English and not as any play on words.

50      However, it must be stated that, both in French and English, the word ‘mini’ is an adjective and the word ‘cargo’ is a noun. As the noun element in the mark applied for, the word ‘cargo’, which means ‘load’ in English, determines the main meaning of that mark in the perception of the relevant public, whereas the word ‘mini’ only serves to characterise the size of the object thus designated.

51      It follows that, although the signs at issue have the element ‘mini’, which means ‘very small’, in common, there is only a low degree of conceptual similarity between them, lower therefore than that which was found to exist by the Board of Appeal, since the main meaning of the mark applied for is determined by the element ‘cargo’.

52      The Court, however, takes the view that, in the light of the average degree of visual and phonetic similarity, the Board of Appeal’s error as regards the degree of conceptual similarity between the earlier mark and the mark applied for is not capable of affecting the finding that there is an average degree of similarity between those marks taken as a whole.

 The likelihood of confusion

53      A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgment of 29 September 1998 in Canon, C‑39/97, ECR, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and judgment of 14 December 2006 in Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM — Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, ECR, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).

54      The Board of Appeal found that, in light of the fact that the goods covered by the marks at issue are identical, the signs at issue are similar to an average degree and the earlier mark has a high degree of distinctive character owing to its reputation, a likelihood of confusion existed.

55      The applicant maintains that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion.

56      It must be borne in mind that, as is apparent from recital 8 of Regulation No 207/2009, the assessment of the likelihood of confusion depends on numerous elements, in particular the public’s recognition of the trade mark on the market in question. The more distinctive the trade mark, the greater will be the likelihood of confusion, and therefore marks with a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of their recognition by the public, enjoy broader protection than marks with less distinctive character (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 November 1997 in SABEL, C‑251/95, ECR, EU:C:1997:528, paragraph 24; judgment in Canon, cited in paragraph 53 above, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 18; and judgment of 22 June 1999 in Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer, C‑342/97, ECR, EU:C:1999:323, paragraph 20).

57      In the present case, it is apparent from the foregoing findings that the goods at issue are identical and that there is an average degree of similarity between the marks at issue, taken as a whole. Furthermore, the applicant in no way disputes the reputation of the earlier mark for motor vehicles in the United Kingdom. There is therefore no need to call into question the Board of Appeal’s finding that the earlier mark has enhanced distinctiveness on account of the recognition of that mark by the public in the United Kingdom.

58      Accordingly, the Board of Appeal was right in finding that there was a risk that consumers might believe that the goods covered by the mark applied for correspond to a line of products marketed by the proprietor of the earlier mark, even taking into account a higher level of attention on the part of the relevant public in the light of the goods in question.

59      That finding cannot be called into question by the various arguments put forward by the applicant.

60      First, the applicant cannot reasonably maintain that acknowledging that there is a likelihood of confusion is tantamount to giving the intervener a monopoly over the use of the word ‘mini’ in respect of the goods at issue even though that word is in everyday use. It must be pointed out that, pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation No 207/2009, exclusive rights are conferred upon the proprietor of the earlier trade mark which allow him, inter alia, to prevent all third parties from using any sign where, because of its similarity to the earlier mark and the identity of the goods covered by the marks at issue, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. The advantage of the legal regime of the Community trade mark lies precisely in the fact that it enables holders of an earlier trade mark to oppose the registration of later marks which take unfair advantage of the distinctiveness or repute of the earlier trade mark. Hence, far from according an unfair and unjustified monopoly to the proprietors of an earlier mark, that regime enables those proprietors to protect and exploit the substantial investment made to promote their earlier mark (judgment of 21 February 2006 in Royal County of Berkshire Polo Club v OHIM — Polo/Lauren (ROYAL COUNTY OF BERKSHIRE POLO CLUB), T‑214/04, ECR, EU:T:2006:58, paragraph 43).

61      Accordingly, in the present case, since the earlier mark has enhanced distinctiveness and there is a likelihood of confusion (see paragraph 57 above), the proprietor of the earlier mark was entitled to oppose the use of the word ‘mini’ in the mark applied for, although that word is in everyday use.

62      Secondly, it is necessary to reject the applicant’s argument that, on account of its use of the French trade mark MAXICARGO, the word ‘mini’ in the mark applied for will necessarily be understood in its ordinary meaning as being the opposite of the word ‘maxi’, therefore excluding any likelihood of confusion. Even if the mark MAXICARGO had been used, which is not proved in the present case, that could not affect the finding that there is a likelihood of confusion as regards the marks MINI and MINICARGO.

63      Thirdly, the applicant cannot maintain that the Board of Appeal did not take into account the decision of the Institut national de la propriété industrielle (National Institute for Industrial Property) and that of the Cour d’appel de Paris (Court of Appeal, Paris) which were relied on before it.

64      It is apparent from the contested decision that the Board of Appeal took the French decisions into account. However, it correctly observed, first, that those decisions related to the perception which French consumers had of the marks at issue, which was not relevant in the context of the assessment of the likelihood of confusion as regards the relevant public in the United Kingdom, and, secondly, that it was not bound by the decisions of national authorities.

65      It follows from all of the foregoing that the single plea in law put forward by the applicant must be rejected and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

 Costs

66      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

67      Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the forms of order sought by OHIM and the intervener.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber)

hereby:

1.      Dismisses the action;

2.      Orders LG Developpement to pay the costs.

Van der Woude

Wiszniewska-Białecka

Ulloa Rubio

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 10 March 2016.

[Signatures]